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   What Economists Know about
Open Source Software




For a decade, economists have been fascinated by the phenomenon
of open source software (OSS). OSS is marked by free access to the
software and its source code. It is developed in a public, collaborative
manner by thousands of non-paid volunteers as well as proﬁt seeking
ﬁrms. Today, OSS is well established in the ICT sector and represents
a new intellectual property paradigm.
This paper provides an introduction into thetopic OSS versus closed
source software (CSS, also called ‘proprietary’ software). After a brief
history of OSS and CSS, the differences between the open and the
closed source principles and the basic logic of OSS business mod-
els are explained. Next, the paper presents what economists know
about the OSS phenomena, i.e. gives an overview of the motives of
the (non-paid) OSS developers, the institutions of OSS, the effects of
OSS on competition, the incentives and role of ﬁrms, and ﬁnally of
open source principle beyond software.
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The last ten years saw a rise in economic research on so-called open source
software (OSS) accompanied by an explosion of OSS-based business mod-
els and investments throughout the ICT sector. The Linux-based Kindle by
Amazon or various smart phones (including the “Goggle Phone”) running
Android are just the most prominent OSS-based products. Other examples
indicating the importance of OSS and OSS-based business models are IBM’s
OSS strategies or the market shares of MySQL and of the Apache web server
software. Figure 1 indicates how economic research on OSS developed: it
shows the number of published articles in economic journals, as listed in
the EconLit database. Clearly, this is only a proxy for research activities, as
many (more recent) papers still circulate as working papers.
Figure 1: Journal articles (EconLit) on “Open Source Software” 1
The emergence of “open source” methods for producing software was
intriguing for economists, because (a) the number of conceptually distinct
incentives (e.g. patents, prizes, grants, contract research, etc.) that society
traditionally uses to promote innovation is—despite differences in detail—
remarkably small (see Scotchmer 2004), and (b) the success of OSS has
challenged conventional wisdom of the role of intellectual property rights
(IPRs). OSS is marked by free access to the software and its source code,
and is developed in a public, collaborative manner. Thus, OSS appears to
be a case of a “private provision of a public good” (Johnson 2002). At a ﬁrst
1This ﬁgure is based on an EconLit database request on December 17th, 2010. Search term
was “Open Source Software” and results were limited to published journal articles.
1
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justiﬁcation for providing temporary monopolies on intellectual property
in terms of copyrights and patents is to avoid a public good situation: (ex
ante) rational agents have an incentive to invest only if (ex post) they have
exclusive intellectual property, i.e. a legal mechanism which enforces ex-
cludability for a limited period of time. Nevertheless, it is a matter of facts,
that thousands of software developers contribute voluntarily, i.e. without
(direct) monetary reward, to OSS. Additionally, also proﬁt seeking ﬁrms
use OSS based business models and contribute to OSS projects.
OSS thus represents a “new intellectual property paradigm” (Maurer and
Scotchmer 2006). In other words: the open source principle represents a
new type of ownership concept for the digital economy. However, OSS has
not completely replaced its counterpart closed source software (CSS), the
latter also called proprietary software. As result, OSS and CSS coexist, and
compete often within the same market. The difference between OSS and
CSS is a difference in institutions.2 OSS and CSS lead to different kinds
of “institutional arrangements” (Davis and North 1971). These coexisting
institutional arrangements are distinguishable by their distinct use of copy-
right law that is codiﬁed in the software licenses. The different types of
licenses lead to different allocations of IPRs and different governance struc-
tures etc.
This paper provides an overview of research on the economics of OSS. Of
course, it is neither possible nor sensible to cover all papers dealing with
OSS. The paper at hand is no literature survey in terms of an exhaustive
list of publications. It is rather an attempt to give an extensive overview.
Naturally, the selection and classiﬁcation of the research contributions are
to some extend based on the subjective view of the author of this paper.
Nevertheless, I think that the selection and classiﬁcation is sensible, and I
hope that it is fruitful for readers who want to know what economists know
about OSS after one ﬁrst decade of research. Furthermore, I see this paper
as a complement to earlier contributions providing literature surveys and
2Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society, or, more formally, are the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990, p 3). They “are made
up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g.,
norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement
characteristics” (North 1994, p 360).
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(2006), Rossi (2006), Lerner and Tirole (2005a) and Schiff (2002).
The remainder of this paper ﬁrst offers a short introduction into the topic
OSS versus CSS (Section 2), including a brief history of OSS and CSS, the
differences between the open and the closed source principles, and the ba-
sic logic of OSS business models. Section 3 then presents what economists
know about the OSS phenomena, i.e. gives an overview of the state of
economic research. Broadly summarized, the existing literature on the eco-
nomics of OSS deals with (a) the intrinsic and extrinsic motives of the
(non-paid) OSS developers, (b) institutions like governance structures and
licenses, (c) the impact of OSS on competition and market outcome, (d)
the incentives and role of ﬁrms, and (e) the possibility to transfer the open
source principle to other ﬁelds. We ﬁnish with a summary.
2 Open versus Closed Source Software: Two
Intellectual Property Right Regimes
2.1 A Brief History of Open and Closed Source Software
In the early days, software was not a single product but more or less a tool
to run the computers. Hence, revenue was created by selling computers,
and the hardware vendors delivered software for free. Although some ﬁrms
were selling the service ‘code writing’, there was no market for ready-made
software products, so-called ‘software packages’.
This picture started to change in the late 1960s, when entrepreneurs re-
alized the opportunity to sell their software to more than one customer,
hence to treat it like an ordinary mass-marketable product. This new con-
cept diffused, and ﬁnally, in the 1980s, the mass publication of packaged
software by independent software vendors was established. Meanwhile the
U.S. hardware producers – except IBM3 – withdrew from software (Stein-
mueller 1996, p 31 ff.). This rise of the software industry went with increas-
ing concern about the protection of exclusive intellectual property rights.
At least since the amendment of U.S. copyright law in 1980, copyright was
3A history of IBM’s licensing strategies, its paradigm shift to CSS and then to a balance
between OSS and CSS, can be found in Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz (2009).
3
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grams. Based on this legal ground, ‘proprietary’, i.e. closed source, business
models were established. As such, the early independent software vendors
invented the CSS-based business models, but were also the driving force
for establishing copyright protection for software. Thus, they also induced
a change on the level of formal institutions.
The industry transition to CSS led to some attempts to preserve the ‘free’
programming culture based on so-called hacker ethics. The most important
attempt was the foundation of a project called GNU (GNU’s Not UNIX).
GNU was founded in 1984 by Richard Stallman, who worked at MIT from
1971 to 1984. Stallman was dissatisﬁed with the rise of the closed source
principle, namely with its consequence for the use of UNIX.4 Therefore he
designed and introduced the GNU General Public License (GPL), nowadays
the most popular type of open source license. The basic idea of the GPL
was to use “copyright law, but ﬂips it over to serve the opposite of its usual
purpose: instead of a means of privatizing software, it becomes a means of
keeping software free” (Stallman 1999, p 59). Thus, the GPL was created
in order to preserve a certain programming culture of free software and
hacker ethics.
This changed the level of institutionalization by transferring some norms
of the hacker ethics—i.e. informal institutions—into a formal institution,
namely the GPL. With the GPL Stallman invented a new concept of copy-
right-based ownership: the so-called ‘copyleft-principle’. Although Stall-
man was not motivated by commercial aspects and the creation on the GPL
was an act of ideology, Stallman’s transformation is an economic success
story. For example, all ﬁrms with business models build on Linux are based
on a GPL-protected software. After the institutionalization of the OSS prin-
ciple by Stallman and others, several entrepreneurs created business mod-
els based on the OSS principle.
So nowadays, ﬁrms and individual programmers have an institutional
choice whether they use OSS, CSS or both. The next section describes the
institutional differences between OSS and CSS. Section 2.3 then provides
a brief explanation of OSS-based business models.
4At this time, UNIX was the most powerful operating system. In the 80s ﬁrms started
selling incompatible, closed source versions of UNIX.
4
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Software is traditionally protected by copyright5 (Graham and Somaya
2004), and the copyright-based license agreements deﬁne the transfer of
the intellectual property rights. The crucial feature which distinguishes
OSS from CSS is the scope of rights transferred by the OSS vs. CSS licenses.
Technically this is mirrored by the question of whether there is general
access to the source code or not.
The source code is the human-readable recipe of a software program: it
is the program code written in a programming language. To run the pro-
gram on a computer, the source code has to be compiled, i.e. transformed
to a (only machine readable) binary code. The crucial point is that the bi-
nary code is not readable for humans. Having only the binary software, it
is virtually impossible to modify the software. But with the source code, de-
velopers can understand how the software is programmed, can eventually
learn from it, and—of course—are able to modify the source code, thus fur-
ther develop the software. Figure 2 summarizes the implications of having
access to the source code or not.
Figure 2: Source Code versus Binary Code
(Source: Schwarz and Takhteyev 2010)
CSS vendors like Microsoft typically transfer their software only as bi-
nary code. They sell the right to use the software, with the scope of legal
5The discussion about so-called software patents is beyond the scope of this paper. For
the topic of software patents see e.g. Blind et al. (2005), Hall and MacGarvie (2006),
Lerner and Zhu (2007), Bessen and Hunt (2007, 2004), Kahin (2004), Pilch (2004).
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allowed, and this is enforced by law and backed by technical solutions like
copy protection. Furthermore, users do not have the right to change the
software, and they are also unable to do so as they have no access to the
source code.
In contrast to this, an open source code enables users to copy the pro-
gram code, to understand how the software works, and to change it. Thus,
OSS is based on a principle of openness, which is codiﬁed in the copyright-
based OSS licenses. These OSS licenses permit users to read, modify, im-
prove, and redistribute the code under certain conditions. These conditions
vary within a wide range. Liberal licenses—like the BSD license6—allow,
for example, the use of the open source code to produce CSS. Such liberal
licenses are also called ‘public’ licenses as they put the code in the public
domain without any restrictions in use. More restricted licenses—like the
GPL7—conﬁne the scope of usage, mainly to ensure that the open source
code stays open source, see also the footnote in Table 1.
OSS and CSS licenses therefore differ in the scope of transferred rights,
which is summarized in Table 1. The two IPR regimes thus yield different
Table 1: Closed Source and Open Source Licenses: Transferred Rights
Usage Change Redistribute
CSS Ø × ×
OSS (restrictive license) Ø Ø (Ø)
∗
OSS (liberal license) Ø Ø Ø
∗Restrictive OSS licenses restrict users’ right to redistribute: Any further developed software as
well any derived work must be licensed as a whole under the same type of license, if this new
code is further transferred, hence (re)distributed.
allocations of IPRs. This has further implications. The kind of ownership of
the source determines the governance structures: The principle of CSS is to
hold exclusive rights regarding the source code. Closed source code is thus
6The BSD license is the license of the Berkeley Software Distribution.
7GPL stands for the GNU General Public License, see also p 4.
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ﬁrms. In this hierarchical structure based on exclusive ownership of assets,
coordination is achieved by giving orders. Conversely, the source code of
OSS is a shared asset. OSS is developed by a decentralized but nevertheless
well-organized community. A complex system of rules has emerged to gov-
ern OSS development. There exist some hierarchical elements with respect
to decision rights, but no one can give orders to other OSS developers. We
will come back to the governance structures of OSS in Section 3.2.
The OSS community consists of thousands of volunteers who develop
software, often without direct monetary reward. Additionally, more and
more proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms engage in OSS development, thus paying pro-
grammers to develop OSS code. Large companies as well as small- and
medium-sized enterprises use OSS-based business models.
2.3 Open Source Business Models
Almost all of today’s high tech products are computerized. While this is
most obviously true for application software (e.g. games), the point increas-
ingly extends to hardware like cell phones and DVD players. In these in-
dustries, a product’s quality—and hence consumer appeal—often depends
sensitively on the software it contains. Before the 1990s, companies usu-
ally developed this as CSS in-house. Since then, however, companies have
increasingly turned to shared open source code instead.
Thus, in many markets software is sold and/or used bundled with other
goods and services. Consequently, OSS business models are based on these
complementary products, as the open source code itself can not be a proﬁt
center (Maurer and Scotchmer 2006, p 289, 290ff). These complements
can be hardware like servers or cell phones, premium versions of the soft-
ware, or different kinds of service like maintenance, and so on. The follow-
ing examples provide some idea of the range of OSS business models:
• Many different products—washing machines, mobile phones, ﬂat-
screen televisions etc.—are controlled by embedded software. Such
embedded software can be OSS. Examples of hardware running em-
bedded Linux are Amazon’s Kindle, Cisco’s MDS and Nexus data
switches, Linksys’s WRT54G W-LAN router, different Motorola, Nokia,
7
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TomTom GPS navigation systems, and various LG, Panasonic, Sam-
sung, and Sony LCD and plasma televisions. The most recent exam-
ple of embedded OSS is Android. Android is a Linux-based software
stack (operating system, middleware and key applications) for mo-
bile devices. Acer, Barnes & Noble, Dell, HTC Corporation/Google,
Lenovo, LG, Motorola, Samsung, and Sony Ericsson all manufacture
and sell products that come Pre-installed with Android.
• Firms in the software industry typically sell a stack of software and
services. So-called system integrators even sell a stack of hardware,
software, and services (Riehle 2007). For example, IBM is selling
several servers with pre-installed Linux like the Red Hat Enterprise
Linux or SUSE Linux Enterprise Server operating system. This is of-
ten based on a collaboration between IBM and the respective Linux
distributor. Red Hat, Novell’s SUSE and other Linux-distributors make
money with ready-to-install ‘distributions’ and the corresponding ser-
vices like support and maintenance. Such distributions consist of
a large collection of well-matched OSS applications, often bundled
with further CSS for ‘enterprise class’ premium versions.
• Internet-based businesses like webhosting and webservices have a
high share of OSS-usage. Most web servers are driven by an OSS
“Lamp Stack” software suite that includes a Linux operating system,
Apache web server, MySQL database, and PHP/Perl/Python program-
ming languages. Development is supported by corporations like Nov-
ell, IBM, Oracle, and Borland who then bundle Lamp with their pro-
prietary hardware and software. Smallweb developers also use Lamp
in their businesses and contribute code back to the project.
Furthermore, ﬁrms with OSS-based business models have joined several
projects and consortia. A prominent example is the Open Handset Alliance
(www.openhandsetalliance.com), a business alliance of 78 ﬁrms for devel-
oping open standards for mobile devices, namely the above-mentioned
Android. Another important consortium is the Linux Foundation, mem-
bers are for example Cisco, Fujitsu, IBM, Nokia, and Oracle (for a full list
of members please visit www.linuxfoundation.org/about/members). The
8
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and the Open Source Development Labs in 2007. The Open Source Devel-
opment Labs consisted of a wide range of Linux-related providers of hard-
ware, software and services (West and Gallagher 2006). Table 2 provides
an overview of the members and their motivations.
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Unix with Linux in tele-
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Design Linux into cus-
tom products for cus-
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Linux support company VA Software, Linuxcare,
LynuxWorks
Sell Linux services




(Source: West and Gallagher 2006)
Several authors have set up taxonomies of OSS business models. See for
example Ghosh et al. (2002a), Fink (2002, Chapter 11), or Daffara (2007).
These typologies are of interest for practitioners like managers or for re-
searcher who do detailed empirical research on ﬁrms with different OSS
business models. However, the different typologies are not of interest for
9
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to the following deﬁnition that subsumes all the different OSS business
models: Firms with OSS business models generate revenue by selling products
(goods or services) that are complements to the freely-accessible OSS.
3 The Economics of Open Source Software
During the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century, the new IPR paradigm of OSS
was attracting more and more interest by economists. In 2000 and 2001
the working-paper versions of three contributions were published, each of
them representing one branch of research on OSS. First, the motives of
volunteers participating in OSS (Lerner and Tirole 2000). Second, the co-
ordination of these contributions, hence the governance structures of OSS
(Weber 2000). And third, the impact of OSS on market outcomes and
competition (Mustonen 2001). These three branches were later supple-
mented by two more recent research aspects: OSS and ﬁrms, and open
source beyond software. The following provides an overview of each of
these branches.
3.1 The (Non-Paid) Open Source Software Developers
The ﬁrst branch of research on OSS deals with the volunteers participating
in OSS. Often the research questions concentrate on why they participate.
Some contributions have a wider focus and are also interested in the socio-
economic characteristics of the OSS developers including their country.
3.1.1 Why Are They: Motives to Participate
Probably the most famous research question regarding the economics of
OSS was asked by Lerner and Tirole (2000, 2002): “Why should thou-
sands of top-notch programmers contribute freely to the provision of a pub-
lic good?” Lerner and Tirole emphasize the role of extrinsic motivation,
namely the acquisition of a reputation-signal. They separate this aspect
into two different incentives: career concern incentives, referring to future
job offers or access to venture capital, and the ego gratiﬁcation incentives,
10
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spired further research on the motives of OSS contributors, analyzing ex-
trinstic as well as intrinsic motives. An overview of this research can be
found in Rossi (2006). Today, the consensus is that a mix of extrinsic and
intrinsic motives explain the behavior of unpaid8 OSS developers.
Most of the research on OSS developer motivation consists of empirical
studies. These surveys indeed report extrinsic motives like peer recognition
and reputation within the community, self-marketing, and career-related
motives like the improvement of programming skills and reputation signals
(Lakhani and Wolf 2005, Hertel et al. 2003, Ghosh et al. 2002b, Hars and
Ou 2002, Lakhani et al. 2002). However, most of these surveys ﬁnd intrin-
sic motives ranking higher than extrinsic ones. Lakhani and Wolf (2005)
ﬁnd that enjoyment-related intrinsic motivations in the form of a sense
of creativity are more important than extrinsic motivations. According to
Lakhani et al. (2002) the two top-ranked motives are that developing OSS
is “intellectually stimulating” and “improves skill”. Ghosh et al. (2002b)
ﬁnd that the most important reasons why developers have joined and stay
in the community are that they want to learn and develop new skills, and
that they want to share their knowledge and skills with other developers.
It is important to note that most of the empirical studies on OSS motives
are surveys. Such surveys reﬂect what the OSS developers report as being
their most important motives but do not take into account the importance
of the developers, their effort levels, etc. An exception is the article by Hars
and Ou (2002). They connect reported motives with the individual effort
and ﬁnd that, although intrinsic motivations play a role, external motives
have greater weight, see Table 3. Hars and Ou (2002) also point out, that
different types of OSS programmers exist. For example students and hobby
programmers are more internally motivated than professionals.
As noted before, the most prominent external motive is job-market sig-
naling: programmers engage in OSS development in order to disclose un-
observable skills. Such a classical signaling of skills, as described by Spence
(1973), then yields higher wages for the employees. In a recent working
paper, Bitzer et al. (2010) test for a wage premium associated with OSS-
8Some developers are paid by ﬁrms for developing OSS. In such a case their motivation is
trivial. For why ﬁrms engage in OSS (thus pay OSS developers) see Section 3.4.
11
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 005Table 3: Motivations and Effort of OSS Programmers
(Source: Hars and Ou 2002)
based signaling exploiting a unique dataset about 7,000 German IT em-
ployees. Remarkably enough, their empirical analysis does not show any
evidence that the signaling actually works. This result is even more striking
as surveys consistently report that OSS developers belief in the signal.
3.1.2 Who Are They: The Socio-Economic Background
Research on motives of the OSS developers is often connected with re-
search on their socio-economic background (Lakhani and Wolf 2005,Lakhani
and Hippel 2003, Hertel et al. 2003, David et al. 2003, Hars and Ou 2002,
Ghosh et al. 2002b, Robles et al. 2001). So beside the motives, questions
of interest are such different issues like the share of female, the education
level, job-position, and so on. In a recent paper David and Shapiro (2008)
12
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ble shows, virtually all OSS developers are male (98.9% to 95%). The vast
majority of developers are either students or employed, with the students
being the smaller fraction of both. Furthermore, the OSS developers are
well educated.
The aim of David and Shapiro (2008) is to bring together the motiva-
tions, personal attributes and behavioral patterns among OSS developers.
They use hierarchical cluster analysis to extract a set of distinctive “moti-
vational proﬁles”. David and Shapiro ﬁnd that OSS developers differ de-
pending on whether they engage in community-based projects, very small
projects or work independently. These differences in attributes refers to
their motivational proﬁles as well as to aspects like demographic character-
istics, education and experience, the likelihood of receiving direct monetary,
and so on.
However, one of the socio-economic variable is the geographic origin of
the developers. As the OSS community is often described as global, OSS
seems to be a digital public good with a truly globalized private provision.
But, apart from anecdotal evidence for the internationality of certain OSS
project teams, the question remains how global the OSS community actu-
ally is and how the supply side of OSS differs among countries. This has
motivated researchers to study the geographical allocation of OSS develop-
ers. It turns out that the most OSS developers come from North America
and Europe. This result is quite consistent regardless of the method used.
The methods to gather information about the geographic origin of OSS
developers can be broadly distinguished into two approaches. Some studies
are based on survey-data, while other work is based on speciﬁc data drawn
from code of certain OSS projects such as credit ﬁles, mailing lists or data
from platforms like SourceForge. Robles et al. (2001) provide a combina-
tion of both types of data collection. In Ghosh (2006), David et al. (2003)
and Ghosh et al. (2002b) one can ﬁnd survey-based information about the
origin of OSS developers. Lancashire (2001) provides information about
the world-wide distribution of Linux and Gnome developers, based on data
collected from the Linux Credit ﬁle and in case of Gnome developer-contact
information from the project’s web-site. The most recent research deal-
ing with the geographic origin of OSS developers is Gonzalez-Barahona
et al. (2008). The authors provide a worldwide picture of OSS develop-
13
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(Source: David and Shapiro 2008)
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et al. (2008) build on Robles and Gonzalez-Barahona (2006). Robles and
Gonzalez-Barahona (2006) use information about the email addresses of
registered users and the indicated time-zone to assign developers at Source-
Forge9 in 2005 to their countries. However, they were unable to assign
25% to countries and therefore had to develop methods to estimate the
geographic allocation for this part. Engelhardt et al. (2010) similarly make
use of data of developers at SourceForge but are able to geographically
identify 94% of all registered OSS developers in 2006 by analyzing IP ad-
dress, email and time-zone. They also use data about the number of posted
messages as proxy for the activity of each registered OSS developer. This
is important, since members of the OSS community differ in their effort
levels, numbers of contributions etc. (see e.g. David and Rullani 2008).10
Hence, Engelhardt et al. (2010) ﬁnd that while most registered developers
were not active in 2006, the average activity level by active developers is
remarkably similar. Furthermore, they ﬁnd that both, active developers per
capita and activity levels differ over the world, and that GDP per capita and
internet usage alone cannot explain these differences.
3.2 The Institutions of Open Source Software Development
Aside from the question of motives, Weber (2000) asks how the OSS de-
velopers “coordinate their contributions on a single ‘focal point’?” (Weber
2000, p 5). Research on OSS has thus to understand how the implications
of the complexity of large OSS projects like Linux are managed. Conse-
quently, in Weber (2004) he describes collaborative methods in the context
of developing OSS. This points to the institutions of OSS, including organi-
zational issues and governance structures, the role of hacker-ethics and the
role, choice and rationale of OSS licenses.11
9SourceForge is the world’s largest site hosting OSS projects, an internet platform where
OSS developers discuss, coordinate their tasks, upload new developed codes etc.
10For further research on the division of labor within open source projects see among others
Besten et al. (2008), Giuri et al. (2008); or Krogh et al. (2003).
11Gehring (2006) and Lessig (2006, 1999) interpret the code itself to be an institution.
However we do not follow this view here.
15
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What kind of organization OSS projects represent and how they are gov-
erned is a question that is widely discussed nowadays Markus (2007) of-
fers a sound survey and a synthesis of this literature. Markus deﬁnes OSS
governance as “the means of achieving the direction, control, and coor-
dination of wholly or partially autonomous individuals and organizations
on behalf of an OSS development project to which they jointly contribute”
(Markus 2007, p 152). Markus (2007) rightly points out that two branches
of research on OSS governance can be distinguished. Some scholars ana-
lyze OSS as a new, distinct but unitary organizational form which can be
differentiated from CSS development (Raymond 1998), characterized as a
private-collective model (Hippel and Krogh 2003, Osterloh and Rota 2007),
and so on. Others emphasize the different types of OSS governance mecha-
nism, or focus on one of these mechanisms speciﬁcally. An overview of the
governance mechanisms is provided by Laat (2007). He groups the main
tools of OSS governance into six categories: modularization, division of
roles, delegation of decision-making, training and indoctrination, formal-
ization, and authority versus democracy. What follows contains examples
from both types of literature.
Let us start with OSS as a unitary organizational form. Very common in
organizational theory is the tripartite division of types of organization into
‘market’, ‘ﬁrm’ and ‘network’ (see Table 5). In this context, OSS projects
Table 5: The three Types of Organization




(Source: Brand and Schmid 2005)
are mostly characterized as networks. An exception is the interpretation of
Demil and Lecocq (2006). They argue that OSS projects differ from net-
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to restrict access, etc. Also Garzarelli (2003) points out the organizational
uniqueness of OSS, arguing that its organizational characteristics can be
explained by a combination of the organizational theory on clubs with the
theory of professions. However, many authors (e.g. Brand and Schmid
2006, 2005, Hippel 2005, Iannacci and Mitleton-Kelly 2005, Benkler 2002)
interpret OSS projects as (special) networks. Based on a case study on the
KDE project12 Brand and Schmid (2005, 2006) ﬁnd that OSS combines the
coordination mechanism of networks with elements of hierarchy, the latter
typically associated with ﬁrms.
The hierarchical elements of OSS organizations are mainly based on deci-
sion rights and the tasks of certain developers. The basic structure of these
hierarchies is often labeled the ‘onion layer’ model, see Figure 3. (See also









(Source: Jensen and Scacchi 2007)
Jensen and Scacchi 2007, Crowston et al. 2006, and Wendel de Joode et al.
2003 pp 18,19.) The career of developers within projects (a participant be-
comes project leader or specialist etc.), i.e. their movement into the core of
12KDE (K Desktop Environment) is an open source graphical user interface (GUI). Together
with the GNOME desktop it is likely the most-known desktop environment (and devel-
opment platform) for Linux and Unix workstations (Webpage: www.kde.org).
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hierarchies and the authority of e.g. project leaders are based on the mer-
itocratic norms of the OSS community, rooted in hacker-ethics (O’Mahony
and Ferraro 2007). Johnson (2006) and Lee and Cole (2003) emphasize
the importance of peer review processes in the control structures of OSS.
In this context Krogh et al. (2003) point to the role of extrinsic motives and
incentives like reputation and signaling.
Several authors underline that the evolution of OSS projects over time
has implications for their organizational forms (Sadowski et al. 2008, Lat-
temann and Stieglitz 2005, Schweik and Semenov 2003, Wynn 2003). Typ-
ically, OSS projects start with one or only a few developers who coordinate
via direct communication based on trust. With the growth of the project
size, more and more ofﬁcial coordination structures are implemented. Fi-
nally the projects characterized by well-deﬁned roles (code-tester, release-
manager, core-developer etc.) combined with a decentralized and modular-
ized organization structure. For example, Crowston and Howison (2005)
have analyzed 120 project teams from SourceForge and ﬁnd that projects
which grow become more modular, with different people responsible for
different modules. Langlois and Garzarelli (2008) explicitly focus on mod-
ularity in open source collaborations, including OSS. They argue that in
such collaborations the division of labor is coordinated through voluntary
exchanges of effort rather than of products.
In his synthesis of research on OSS governance, Markus (2007) con-
cludes that three OSS governance purposes are linked to six OSS gover-
nance categories, see Table 6. According to Markus (2007), OSS gover-
nance has to solve collective action dilemmas and coordination problems,
and has to create a climate such that developers contribute to the particular
project (rather than to others). To achieve these goals tools from the six
governance categories are used. For example, rules about the software de-
velopment process and rules about how information will be communicated
and managed using certain tools (repositories), both support coordination.
Conﬂict rules as well as meta-rules solve coordination problems but also
create a good climate for contributors. The community rules – which de-
termine who can become a member, what roles members can play etc. –
clearly support all three purposes. Finally, tools that solve collective action
dilemmas and create a contributor-friendly climate belong to the categories
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Ownership rules x x
Chartering rules x x
Community rules x x x
Software development process rules x
Conﬂict rules and rules about rules x x
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the goals of the project, what the software should look like, and so on. The
second refers to the use of (intellectual) property law: the formal legal
organizational structure (e.g. a foundation) and the type of license etc.
3.2.2 Legal Protection: Software Licenses and More
O’Mahony (2003) shows in detail how OSS projects use intellectual prop-
erty law to protect their work. OSS projects make use of restrictive li-
cense terms or trademark registration etc. Additionally, often the copyright,
trademark etc. is transferred to a foundation. Such foundations are better
suited to enforcing e.g. the license restrictions or protecting the brand of
the project.
The type of OSS license is an important institution, as it deﬁnes how the
code can be used. Some authors analyze the importance of the respective li-
cense for the governance of an OSS project. For example, Franck and Jung-
wirth (2003) argue that the GPL is constructed such that egoistic motives
(‘rent seeking’) do not crowd out altruistic motives (‘donation’). Moreover,
according to Franck and Jungwirth (2003), the GPL creates incentives for
participation for both rent seekers and donators.
Sen et al. (2008) examine how the OSS license type (ranging from very
restrictive to very liberal) can be explained by the motivations and attitudes
of the OSS developers. They ﬁnd that intrinsic motivation of challenge
(problem solving) is connected with a preference for moderate restrictions,
while extrinsic motivation of status (peer recognition) is linked to licenses
with least restrictions. Another study on the determinants of OSS license
choice is offered by Lerner and Tirole (2005b). They ﬁrst develop a theo-
retical model and then test the model predictions empirically. According to
Lerner and Tirole, OSS projects are more likely to have restricted licenses
if they are consumer-oriented (e.g. desktop tools or games) and if they
are developed in a corporate setting. Projects oriented toward developers
and/or designed to run on commercial operating systems have less restric-
tive licenses. Finally, less restricted projects tend to attract more developers.
A discussion about the relationship between OSS business models and the
type of OSS licenses is provided by Laat (2005). This includes a description
of Netscape’s experience with different licenses, when the company turned
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is named Mozilla with its products Firefox and Thunderbird.
D’Antoni and Rossi (2007) present a model with incomplete contracting
to analyze the rationale for liberal versus restricted licenses, hence the BSD
license versus the GPL. D’Antoni and Rossi (2007) ﬁnd that the GPL is su-
perior to coordinate and encourage joint effort by many (possibly small)
developers; while the BSD is better suited to generate positive spillovers
to other developers when no feedback is required. Gaudeul (2005) also
compares the GPL and the BSD license, but her model also allows for a
CSS license. Each software project consists of a sequence of cumulated
innovations. The software has the same value for the project leader, the de-
velopers, and consumers. If the software has a high net market value and
thus high proﬁts, the project leader develops the software on its own and
sell it under a CSS license. Otherwise it is rationale to choose a OSS license.
The project owner forsake the proﬁts of the CSS case but this is overcom-
pensated by the cost effect: in the OSS case the project leaders (who draws
utility from consuming software) gets the software developed by others ‘for
free’. The model predicts that the GPL will be chosen when the opportu-
nity costs of developing the software are low relative to the value of the
software (small efforts bring big rewards). Otherwise the project leader
chooses the BSD. In this case developers simultaneously develop the code
as they hope to be the ﬁrst one. If a developer would win this race he or she
could then claim her rights exclusively: the BSD allows to turn OSS code
into CSS, i.e. sell it for a positive price. Furthermore, Gaudeul (2005) ﬁnds
that competition makes OSS licenses more attractive because competition
reduces the prices and hence proﬁts of an CSS project leader: In a ‘ﬁrst
mover, second mover’ set up, the ﬁrst mover must lower its prices in order
to deter the development of an OSS alternative by the second mover.
Typically the literature on OSS versus CSS licenses does not differenti-
ate between the divergent OSS license types. Using a centipede-type game,
Polanski (2007) analyzes CSS versus OSS licensing as a mechanism de-
sign issue. He models cumulative production, thus sequential production
where the outputs of the stages 1...k − 1 are inputs for stage k. In such
an environment, according to Polanski, a public (open source) license is
better suited if the project is highly modular and there are signiﬁcant re-
turns to scale. Scotchmer (2010) considers a model with two sequential
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innovator. Firms can choose between a closed source license (proprietary
license) and an open source license (namely the GPL). The ﬁrm that turns
out to be the ﬁrst innovator will then prefer closed source licensing over
open source licensing (GPL) in the intermediate stage. The reason is that
for the ﬁrst innovator the closed source license is more proﬁtable. Scotch-
mer (2010) also ﬁnds that closed source licensing by the ﬁrst innovator in
the intermediate stage is efﬁcient in the sense that it creates the same out-
come as ex post bargaining. Nevertheless, industry proﬁts would be higher
if the industry uses an open source license. Furthermore, it is not known
ex ante who will be the ﬁrst innovator. So in the beginning, the two ﬁrms
are behind a “veil of ignorance” where they then should favor to commit
to open source licensing. Bessen (2006) uses a model based on incomplete
contracting and the hold-up problem to shed light on the rationale of OSS
licensing. The result of his model is that OSS licensing can be more ef-
ﬁcient than CSS licensing in the case of complex products like software.
According to Bessen, OSS will be mainly used by ﬁrms that have complex
specialized needs and their own development capabilities.
Inspired by the case of OSS, Benkler (2002) discuss the rationale for
what he calls “commons based peer production”. He refers to Demsetz’s
explanation of the emergence of property rights and Coase’s theory of the
ﬁrm (Demsetz 1967, Coase 1937). Benkler focuses on the information
problem of who is the best person for a given talk. His main argument
is that under certain circumstances peer production is better suited than
markets or hierarchies (ﬁrms) “in matching the best available human cap-
ital to the best available information inputs in order to create information
products” (Benkler 2002, p 444). Another contribution that links the phe-
nomenon of OSS to the concept of transaction costs is Engelhardt (2008).
Based on a property rights approach the rationale for both IPR paradigms
(open source versus closed source) is discussed. He argues that open source
and closed regimes coexist because both are second-best solutions. Ex-post
transaction costs make the ﬁrst best set of contracts regarding a source
code impossible as some IPRs of the code are not exclusively separable.
Rights that are not exclusively separable are bundled. It can be rationale
to exclusively claim these bundled rights (closed source). But is can also
be rationale not to claim these rights. First, it does not cause costs to forgo
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action costs. Second, limits in separating and trading rights inhibit some
feedback-effects. Enabling such effects can overcompensate the costs (e.g.
lost revenue) to forgo the rights.
3.2.3 Macro-Level Institutions and Cultural Aspects
All the research contributions mentioned so far have in common that they
deal with micro-level institutions. (Also in general, OSS is mainly a topic of
microeconomic research.) To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are
only two papers that focus on macro-level institutions. More precisely, here
the research question is how a country’s institutional and cultural frame-
work inﬂuence on the supply side of OSS.
Ramanujam (2007) links cultural factors with the geographics of OSS
developers. Ramanujam uses data from Ghosh (2006) and Hofstede’s cul-
tural indicators to analyze how differences in national culture affect or
inﬂuence the participation in OSS. He links the geographical distribution
of developers with the four dimensions of national cultures considered by
Hofstede (1991). Ramanujam states a positive correlation between the
share of OSS developers and ’Individualism’, whereas ’Power Distance’ and
’Uncertainty Avoidance’ are negatively correlated each. However, the re-
sults might be interpreted with care, as Ramanujam does not control for
aspects like number of inhabitants, GDP , or internet access, and he distin-
guishes four regions only. With their cross-country study, Engelhardt and
Freytag (2010) analyzes how several cultural and institutional factors in-
cluding norms and attitudes can explain the global differences in OSS ac-
tivities. Based on Engelhardt et al. (2010), they run regressions with data
from about 70 countries. Their ﬁndings are that social capital (interper-
sonal trust), individualism/self-determination, and an optimistic view of
scientiﬁc progress support OSS activities. OSS also beneﬁts from a low de-
gree of regulation, and good protection of IPRs. According to Engelhardt
and Freytag (2010) these results support a view of OSS as being an en-
trepreneurial activity that relies on trust and IPR protection. It has a strong
individualistic/self-deterministic aspect, combined with a spirit of individ-
ual initiatives. The results for market regulation and IPR protection show
the importance of OSS activities connected to business models. Finally,
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protection of IPRs because OSS is not anti-IPR but a new IPR paradigm.
3.3 Market Outcome and Competition
Mustonen (2001, 2003) was the ﬁrst to analyze the impact of OSS on com-
petition and market outcome. This was followed by several contributions
on this topic. In this context it is useful to distinguish models with non-
commercial OSS from those with commercial OSS. In case of the ﬁrst, all
the OSS is provided by the non-commercial community. There can be ﬁrms
who use this OSS as input, but there is no OSS developed by ﬁrms. The
second branch focuses on markets where ﬁrms contribute to OSS.13
3.3.1 Only the (Non-Commercial) Community Provides Open
Source Software
Mustonen (2001, 2003) belongs to the branch focusing on non-commer-
cial OSS. He models the interaction between the OSS community and a
CSS monopolist. The monopolist is affected by OSS in two markets: the
product market and the labor market. Consumers can either buy CSS or use
OSS for free. However, both types of software cause implementation costs.
Programmers choose to work for the monopolist at a wage that the mo-
nopolist sets, or develop OSS and thus build reputations that results future
income. In Mustonen’s setting, highly talented programmers have incen-
tives to join the OSS community. The basic result is that if the software
implementation costs are low, OSS and CSS coexist. The presence of OSS
lowers the CSS vendor’s monopoly power in both markets. The impact of
non-commercial OSS on the outcome of software markets is also analyzed
by Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006). Their model is inspired by
the competition between the operating systems Linux vs. Microsoft’s Win-
dows and is a dynamic mixed duopoly of CSS and non-commercial OSS.
13Models with commercial OSS also contribute to the topic ‘OSS business models’. The
distinction is made based on the focus of the paper. If the main purpose is to analyze
the market outcome, then we consider it in this section. If the main purpose is to explain
the rationales for OSS business models, then it is mentioned it in the next section.
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fects which yield network externalities: the cumulative output of each oper-
ating system (installed base) affects their relative position over time. They
ﬁnd that Windows can survive in the market, hence coexist with Linux, if
the installed base effect is strong enough.14 Additionally, they show that
welfare in the mixed case can be smaller than under a Windows monopoly.
Economides and Katsamakas (2006) focus on the fact that operating sys-
tems like Linux and Windows are platforms. Making use of the theory
of two-sided markets, Economides and Katsamakas (2006) compare indus-
try structures based on an OSS platform with those based on a CSS plat-
form. They compare a vertically integrated CSS-industry, a vertically dis-
integrated CSS-industry, and an industry with an OSS platform and CSS
applications. Economides and Katsamakas (2006) provide conditions for
each of these industries to have the highest industry proﬁts. They also
ﬁnd that welfare is maximized if the industry is characterized by an OSS
platform with different CSS applications.
Gaudeul (2008) presents a circular city model (Vickrey-Salop model)
that focuses on markets where users are ICT specialists and thus all of them
are (potentially) user-developers (like in web server software markets). In
her model users decide whether to buy a CSS project or contribute to an
OSS project. Gaudeul (2008) compares a pure OSS industry, a pure CSS
industry, and a mixed industry where CSS and OSS projects alternate in
location of the circle. She ﬁnds that welfare in such a mixed industry may
be higher than in a pure OSS industry and is higher than in the pure CSS
case. Also in Bitzer (2004) OSS is developed solely by the community. He
analyzes a case where a CSS ﬁrm faces the emergence of OSS. However,
Bitzer (2004) takes into account ﬁrms with OSS-based business models.
Firms with OSS business models can use the OSS code for free and bear
only the costs for producing the complementary products. The CSS ﬁrms
on the other hand have to bear the costs for both software development
and production of complements. Bitzer (2004) uses a Launhardt-Hotelling
model set-up and derives the result that product heterogeneity is the crucial
factor in this setting. If the heterogeneity between the OSS and CSS based
14They assume that in t = 0 Windows is perceived more valuable than Linux. Hence
Windows has an advantage in the beginning.
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with competition in technological levels rather than in prices or quantities
is proposed by Bitzer and Schröder (2007). They ﬁnd that the chosen tech-
nological level is higher in markets with OSS and CSS than in pure CSS
markets. The highest technological level is achieved in pure OSS markets.
The growth-effect of innovations that come form the non-commercial OSS
community is the topic of Saint-Paul (2003). In his model, a proﬁt moti-
vated R & D sector coexists with the introduction of free blueprints invited
by philanthropists. In other words: software-innovations come from for-
proﬁt ﬁrms (CSS) and from a non-commercial OSS community. His main
ﬁnding is that the growth effect of philanthropy (the OSS community) can
be negative: while non-proprietary innovations boosts growth in the short
run, it can reduce growth in the long run. The reason is that the existence
of OSS reduces proﬁts of the CSS ﬁrms and hence reduces their incentives
to innovate. This effects can be so strong that long-run growth also falls.
Sen (2007) models competition in software markets where CSS vendors
compete against ﬁrms who sell improved versions of OSS. The latter repre-
sents the business model of OSS ‘distributors’ as explained in Section 2.3,
p 8. Firms take a given OSS and improve its usability with support and ser-
vice (SS). Therefore, Sen calls this type of software OSS-SS. Consumers can
thus choose to use either OSS for free, or purchase either OSS-SS or CSS.
The CSS and OSS-SS ﬁrms decide on the usability of their software, while
OSS has a ﬁxed, low usability. Furthermore, users differ in their valuation
of software usability (a Hotelling’s model approach). Sen (2007) takes into
account network effects in terms of installed base. Here OSS and OSS-SS
users belong to the same installed base, as both use the same software in
technical terms. Sen (2007) ﬁnds the following results, from which he then
also draws management implications. With weak network effects, CSS al-
ways have a market share of more than 50%, with its usability and prices
being higher than those of OSS-SS. If network effects are high, proﬁts for
the OSS-SS vendors are maximized if they offer the same usability as their
CSS rivals. In such a case, CSS is driven out of the market.
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Firms that do not only use but also develop OSS (commercial OSS) are the
topic of Verani (2006) and Schmidtke (2006). In both cases OSS ﬁrms
develop code and produce complementary products. Verani (2006) uses
a duopoly model to analyze under which conditions ﬁrms produce more
code, under an OSS rather than under a CSS regime. Verani ﬁnds that
ﬁrms develop more code when their products are substitutes and OSS
is chosen. For products being strong complements a CSS regime yields
higher investments. Schmidtke (2006) uses a non-differentiated Cournot
oligopoly model to analyze an industry with OSS ﬁrms only. Firms invest in
a homogeneous private good (e.g. a computer server) and a homogeneous
public good (i.e. OSS). Schmidtke describes the conditions under which
government provision of OSS yields an increase of private provision of OSS
(crowding in) rather than an decrease (crowding out). Furthermore, he
analyzes the impact of market entry Schmidtke ﬁnds that increasing the
number of ﬁrms in the market promotes welfare, while the effects on in-
vestments, prices and proﬁts are ambiguous and depend on the parameter
settings. Lambardi (2009) analyzes innovation investment in a Stackelberg
duopoly with different initial technological levels. He compares a pure CSS
duopoly (both ﬁrms are CSS ﬁrms) with a mixed duopoly where the leader
is a CSS ﬁrm but the follower is an OSS ﬁrm. Both ﬁrms face consumers
divided in two types: the ﬁrst group just needs the basic software and does
not require the complementary good, while the second group of consumers
consume both. As the OSS ﬁrm cannot sell the software solely it can gener-
ate revenues only by selling the OSS-based complementaries to the second
type of consumers. On the other hand the OSS ﬁrms receives development
help from the OSS community which reduces its costs. Furthermore Lam-
bardi (2009) also endogenizes the decision of the follower to become an
OSS ﬁrm. The leader takes this option into account when choosing its op-
timal investment. His ﬁndings are that this OSS “threat” can yield to an
decrease in overall innovation: the CSS leader invests less in oder to re-
strain the follower from becoming an OSS ﬁrm. In this context Lambardi
also points out that a government subsidy to OSS ﬁrms can be potentially
harmful for innovation.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the only contributions that model
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oligopoly) with OSS and CSS ﬁrms—are Engelhardt (2010), Engelhardt
and Maurer (2010), and Llanes and de Elejalde (2009):
Applying a general two-stage model with horizontal product differentia-
tion, Engelhardt (2010) analyzes the strategic nature of open source ver-
sus closed source business models and and the role of OSS license-type. In
stage one ﬁrms develop software, as OSS or CSS. If the license is of lib-
eral type (e.g. the BSD), ﬁrms can use an OSS-CSS-mix, otherwise not. In
stage two, ﬁrms bundle this software with complementary products and
compete à la Cournot. The software determines the quality of the prod-
ucts. Based on the model ﬁndings Engelhardt points out that OSS lets ﬁrms
avoid quality competition as they can cooperate on quality without an ex-
plicit contract. Regarding the strategic interactions Engelhardt ﬁnds that
while CSS-decisions are always strategic substitutes, OSS-decisions can be
strategic complements. Furthermore, CSS is a strategic substitute for OSS
and vice versa. An important result of Engelhardt’s (2010) model is that
the type of OSS license plays a crucial role: Nash-equilibria with ﬁrms
producing OSS for all parameters exist only for restricted licenses (e.g.
the GPL). Next, he analyzes the equilibrium ratios of OSS/CSS ﬁrms in
a mixed industry. The ﬁndings are that OSS-ﬁrms offer lower quality than
their CSS-rivals, and where horizontal product differentiation is low CSS-
based products have the largest market share. Using the model setup of
Engelhardt (2010), Engelhardt and Maurer (2010) concentrate on welfare
aspects. They mainly focus on cases without non-paid OSS volunteers (all
OSS is commercial OSS). They point out that from a social point of view,
the cost-saving beneﬁts from OSS code-sharing are contrasted by the OSS
cartel effect: code-sharing guarantees that no OSS ﬁrm can offer better
software than any other OSS ﬁrm. This suppresses quality competition be-
tween OSS ﬁrms and restricts their code output. Competition from CSS
ﬁrms weakens this quality-cartel effect. As result, the equilibria of mixed
industries offer higher welfare than pure-OSS or pure-CSS. Furthermore,
pure-OSS (pure-CSS) industries are sometimes stable against CSS (OSS)
entry so that the mixed OSS/CSS state never occurs. Even where mixed
OSS/CSS industries do exist, the proportion of OSS ﬁrms needed to stabi-
lize the market against entry is always larger than the target ratio required
to optimize welfare. Next, Engelhardt and Maurer (2010) discuss vari-
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icy, funding of OSS development, and procurement preferences. According
to them, the ﬁrst-best solution in the model is to tax OSS ﬁrms and grant
tax breaks to CSS ﬁrms. Conversely, government interventions that fund
OSS development or establish procurement preferences for OSS software
increase the gap between desired and actual OSS/CSS ratios still further.
Despite this, funding OSS development can still improve welfare by boost-
ing total (private plus government) OSS investment above the levels that a
private OSS cartel would deliver.
Llanes and de Elejalde (2009) consider a model in which each ﬁrm sells
packages consisting of a primary good (which can be OSS or CSS) and
a complementary private good. Consumers have a binary demand (each
consumer buys one package, or nothing) and idiosyncratic preferences so
that they usually favor one ﬁrm’s private good over others. However, ri-
val ﬁrms can overcome this preference by investing in a technology that
simultaneously increases the quality of both the primary good and also the
complement. Llanes and DeElejalde present a two stage model in which a
predetermined number of ﬁrms (a) decide whether to produce OSS or CSS
in the primary good, and then (b) simultaneously decide the quality/price
of the bundle thats they will offer to consumers. They ﬁnd that when most
of the bundle’s value comes from the primary good OSS ﬁrms ﬁnd it hard
to appropriate proﬁts from their investment in an open complement. This
leads to outcomes in which a small number of ﬁrms choose CSS and cap-
ture most of the market by delivering high quality code; the other ﬁrms
become OSS and deliver comparatively low quality code at a low price.
However, this situation changes where consumers value the complement
roughly as much as the primary. In this case, the cost advantage of code-
sharing dominates so that all ﬁrms choose to become OSS even though a
hypothetical CSS ﬁrm would produce higher quality software. This (theo-
retical) CSS quality advantage reﬂects OSS ﬁrms’ limited ability to recover
quality gains from consumers. The advantage disappears in cases where
most of the bundle’s value comes from the complementary good.
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Beside the motives of individual contributors, the engagement of ﬁrms is of
interest. Here research analyzes the incentives for ﬁrms to contribute and
the roles ﬁrms play within the OSS community.
3.4.1 Firms Within the Community: Role, Inﬂuence and
Relationships
Dahlander (2007) analyzes the role ﬁrms play in OSS projects, distinguish-
ing between projects initiated by ﬁrms versus community-initiated ones
and high versus low degree of ﬁrm participation. He focuses on de novo
entrants (new organizational entities are formed) and draws conclusions
for the management of OSS-based business models. The fact that an OSS
project was founded by a ﬁrm rather than by the community has inﬂuence
on its governance structure (West and O’Mahony 2008). Governance of
community projects is largely pluralistic, while in ﬁrm-initiated projects
the ultimate decisions are controlled by the company.15 Furthermore, ﬁrm-
initiated projects tend to have less restrictive licenses rather than the GPL.
Here ﬁrms are an origin of more ﬂexibly licensed OSS (Koski 2005), includ-
ing the strategy of dual-licensing (Välimäki 2003) like e.g. an open source
basic version and a closed source premium version.
Dahlander and Magnusson (2005) examines how the relationships that
ﬁrms have to the OSS communities are connected with their way of doing
business. He distinguishes three types of strategies. With the “symbiotic ap-
proach” the ﬁrm and the community gain, as the ﬁrm strongly contributes
back. If the ﬁrm uses a “commensalistic approach” (ﬁrm uses input from
the community), the ﬁrm gains while the community is indifferent. Finally,
in a “parasitic” ﬁrm-community relationship the ﬁrm exploits, i.e. uses in-
put without obeying norms, values and rules of the community. Not surpris-
ingly, Dahlander and Magnusson (2005) report that ﬁrms who use a more
symbiotic approach have more possibilities to inﬂuence the community. But
such ﬁrms have to manage their dual roles of being a proﬁt-seeking ﬁrm
and part of the community. The competitive advantage of an OSS ﬁrm can
hence be inﬂuenced by the relations it may have with OSS communities.
15This can also be a group of ﬁrms founding an alliance.
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to successfully cooperate with and gain from the community, ﬁrms have to
have capabilities and in-house expertise.
Henkel (2009) focuses on the individual developers who establish the
link between OSS ﬁrms and the OSS community. Here a principal-agent
problem might exist, caused by the developer’s double allegiance to ﬁrm
and community. Thus some ﬁrms fear the risk of losing intellectual prop-
erty, etc. Henkel (2009) uses data derived from interviews and a large-scale
survey. He ﬁnds no evidence of commercially harmful behavior induced by
OSS ideology (“Software has to be free” etc.). Also Dahlander and Wallin
(2006) emphasize the role individuals play in the attempts of ﬁrms to un-
lock communities as complementary assets. Based on network analysis
they show that ﬁrms sponsor individuals to act strategically within the OSS
community.
Based on data from SourceForge (the leading online depository for OSS
projects), Lerner et al. (2006) analyze the kind of projects to which ﬁrms
contribute. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms tend to contribute more to larger projects
that grow faster (in terms of code lines). In their dataset, Lerner et al.
(2006) can not ﬁnd any consistent relationship between the type of OSS
license and corporate contributions.
3.4.2 Why and Which Firms Go Open Source
Henkel (2006b) is focusing on the incentive for ﬁrms to contribute code
back to the community even if they are not obliged to do so. The explana-
tion he can draw form his empirical study is that the ﬁrms can expect a kind
of reciprocal behavior: they receive informal development support from the
community which even includes other ﬁrms. At the same time ﬁrms protect
their intellectual property by reveling only parts of their code, only several
modules respectively. Henkel (2006a) provides a duopoly model of why
ﬁrms use and contribute to embedded Linux. The two ﬁrms require two
technologies (or software modules) but value these technologies differently.
As a result, each ﬁrm concentrates on producing the software it values most,
publishes this as OSS and receives the OSS developed by the other ﬁrm.
The economic logic of Henkel’s model is basically a dual version of the
‘exploitation of the great by the small’ analyzed by Olson and Zeckhauser
31
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 005(1966), Olson (1971). According to Henkel’s model, ﬁrms are most likely
to choose OSS business models when competition is low, and each ﬁrm’s
technology needs are different. In a duopoly model, Baake and Wichmann
(2004) analyze the rationale of ﬁrms to publish parts of their software as
OSS. Because of spillovers, publishing code as OSS reduces the ﬁrms’ cod-
ing costs. But OSS encourages entry and thus increases the expenditures
required to deter entry. In equilibrium, both ﬁrms publish open source code,
which yields higher quality either because of reduced costs or because of
the threat of entry. The latter effect is even stronger and dominates when
the software-products are strong substitutes. In Casadesus-Masanell and
Llanes (2009) consumers consume software and a complementary service.
The software is further segmented into a core program which consumers
can use as a free-standing unit, and extensions which are valueless without
the core unit. Their model features a continuum of consumers with hetero-
geneous tastes, where each consumer buys just one package (bundle) or
nothing (binary demand). Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes then examine
how ﬁrms decide whether to develop one or both software components as
OSS or CSS. Three cases are considered here: a monopoly, a ﬁrm vs. non-
proﬁt OSS project, and duopoly. They ﬁnd, inter alia, that ﬁrms are more
willing to open modules when (a) consumer demand for the complemen-
tary good is strong, and (b) the quality of OSS is boosted by exogenous
user innovation at no cost.
The relationship between OSS and entrepreneurship is analyzed by Gru-
ber and Henkel (2006), who focus on new ventures that apply embedded
Linux. Based on data from personal interviews they conclude that the key
challenges for new ventures discussed in the entrepreneurship literature
are of less relevance for such OSS-ﬁrms. The empirical study of Fritsch
and Engelhardt (2010) analyzes the characteristics of new businesses in
the German ICT industry distinguished by how OSS-intensive their busi-
ness model was. The analysis uses data about 680 start-ups and is based
on a survey among founders of ICT ﬁrms in Germany conducted in fall
2009. This is the ﬁrst study that directly compares OSS- and CSS-based
start-ups and analyzes which aspects shape their OSS vs. CSS choices. The
ﬁndings are that ﬁrms with OSS-based business models tend to be smaller
in terms of staff and capital. OSS-ﬁrms also experience less shortages of
capital. Furthermore, the data show that OSS business models seem to
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have larger problems than their CSS counterparts to convince potential ﬁ-
nanciers to invest. According to Fritsch and Engelhardt (2010) their data
do not indicate that the lower entry barriers for OSS ﬁrms are particularly
attractive for start-ups with low human capital endowment or to necessity-
motivated entrepreneurs.
There are other contributions providing comparative studies of OSS and
CSS ﬁrms: Lamastra Rossi (2009) and Harison and Koski (2010). Based
on a sample of 134 software solutions developed by Italian small and
medium sized enterprises, Lamastra Rossi (2009) concludes that OSS so-
lutions seems to be more innovative. Harison and Koski (2010) use survey
data from 170 Finish software companies and analyze how the ﬁrms’ prop-
erties shape their OSS-vs-CSS decision. They distinguish between ﬁrms
with no OSS (ﬁrms that provide only CSS) and ﬁrms with OSS (either
purely or as hybrid strategy, i.e. an OSS-CSS-mix). Harison and Koski
(2010) ﬁnd that the decision to use some vs. no OSS can be explained
by several characteristics of the software ﬁrms. In particular, human capi-
tal (education) has a positive impact on OSS strategies, and ﬁrms that are
younger and smaller more often apply OSS supply strategies. Software
ﬁrms owned by one or two individuals or a family tend to be CSS-only.
Finally, the magnitude of the service variety provided by the ﬁrms has a
positive impact on the propensity to adopt OSS strategies.
3.5 Open Source Beyond Software
Someauthors discuss the possibility to implementthe open source paradigm
in areas other than software. This must not be confused with research on
online communities beyond OSS, like research on Wikipedia (e.g. Gaio
et al. 2009, Ciffolilli 2003). Here open source beyond software means ap-
plying similar open source mechanisms to other industries based on digital
goods, i.e. “payoff-relevant bitstring[s]” (Quah 2003). For example, an im-
portant project of the open source movement in genomics-based research
is the International Human Genome Project. Laboratories from all over the
world jointly collaborate to map and sequence the human genome, with
the resulting data deposited into the public domain.
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centives are suitable for the several stages of the drug discovery pipeline.
Allarakhia et al. (2010) examine the mechanisms of cooperative knowledge
production and dissemination in open source biopharmaceutical innova-
tion. They analyze about 50 open source initiatives that focus on genomic,
proteomic, and systems-based research. Based on this, Allarakhia et al.
(2010) develop a two-player game model in order to further analyze the
incentives to participate in open source biopharmaceutical initiatives. In
her book “Biobazaar”, Janet Hope discuss the challenges and implications
of applying open source principles to biotechnology. She argues that open
source biotechnology would foster competition in the industry that today
tends to be dominated by a few powerful players Hope (2008). Henkel
and Maurer (2007) discuss the economics of open source synthetic biology,
including the consequence of different access and usage rules regarding
the community’s Registry of Standard Biological Parts. Finally, Roosendaal
(2007) discusses the (legal) problems that occur when commercial compa-
nies are invited to join open source projects in biomedics. Such problems
are a result of the tension between traditional proprietary regimes and open
source approaches in this ﬁeld.
4 Summary: What Do Economists Know about
Open Source Software?
After a ﬁrst decade of economic research on OSS, one can say that we know
a lot about this issue. Economists understand quite well why ‘thousands of
top-notch programmers contribute freely to the provision of’ OSS, and how
the commercial and non-commercial agents manage to coordinate their
provisions. The developers’ motives are basically a mix of extrinsic and in-
trinsic ones. For example, a programmer contributes code because he or
she likes programming and at the same time he or she wants to generate
a signal for the job market. OSS projects are governed by a set of sophisti-
cated rules that enable them to stay open and permeable but at the same
time delegates tasks to speciﬁc people with speciﬁc role. With their hier-
archies in (passive) decision rights, OSS projects remind in some sense of
ﬁrms, although ﬁrm-hierarchies are based on order.
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the different types of OSS licenses is also understood—at least partly. In a
nutshell, exclusive intellectual property can have its limits either because
innovations depend on each other and are cumulative, or because of ex post
transaction costs or hold-up problems. Here OSS can be an alternative, and
sometimes even performs better—in terms of individual or social payoff, or
both. However, all types of licenses are based on copyright law, and this
explains why OSS activities are—among other country-speciﬁc institutional
and cultural factors—positively affected by a good de facto protection of
IPRs.
Besides differences in detail, the bottom line of the research on the im-
pact of OSS on competition and market outcome is that the emergence of
OSS increased market outcomes and welfare. However, recent research
points out that an OSS-only world is also not favorable. It seems to be
true that the coexistence of OSS and CSS is desirable as both principles
have their pros and cons. This is also mirrored in the micro-level: Most
ﬁrms in the ICT sector use both, OSS and CSS, in their business models.
Furthermore, they use a wide range of license schemes and have differ-
ent and sometimes quite sophisticated strategies to incorporate OSS and
the OSS community into their everyday businesses. Nevertheless, the basic
principle of OSS business models is the combination of the public OSS with
complementary private goods or services.
The fact that OSS is successful and has its advantages has inspired var-
ious colleagues to ask whether the open source paradigm can be used in
areas other than software. Namely open source biology/biotechnology is
a recently discussed topic here. There are some promising aspects of this
new research topic ‘open source beyond software’.
Without any doubt, the research on open source beyond software bene-
ﬁts from what we have learned from the software example. However, some
of the results of the OSS case are too speciﬁc to draw general conclusion.
Future research on open source therefore might try to focus more on gen-
eral aspects that can be found not only in software. Knowing what is similar
(or general) and what is different can then help to learn from OSS as one
well-studied example of the open source principle.
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